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In this paper, we present a new methodology for quantifying the reliability of complex systems, using
techniques from network graph theory. In recent years, network theory has been applied to many areas
of research and has allowed us to gain insight into the behaviour of real systems that would otherwise be
difficult or impossible to analyse, for example increasingly complex infrastructure systems. Although this
work has made great advances in understanding complex systems, the vast majority of these studies only
consider a systems topological reliability and largely ignore their spatial component. It has been shown
that the omission of this spatial component can have potentially devastating consequences. In this paper,
we propose a number of algorithms for generating a range of synthetic spatial networks with different
topological and spatial characteristics and identify real-world networks that share the same character-
istics. We assess the influence of nodal location and the spatial distribution of highly connected nodes on
hazard tolerance by comparing our generic networks to benchmark networks. We discuss the relevance
of these findings for real world networks and show that the combination of topological and spatial
configurations renders many real world networks vulnerable to certain spatial hazards.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Infrastructure systems, including water, electricity, transporta-
tion and telecommunication, are of critical importance to our
modern communities. The reliability of these physical assets and
the services they provide are vital for ensuring national security,
public health and productivity [20]. It is therefore no surprise that
the reliability of these systems has received a great deal of at-
tention in recent years [23]. However, these systems are becoming
increasingly complex and interdependent, meaning that they now
rely on each other to function normally [15,21], and this increased
complexity and reliance is making these networked infrastructure
systems harder to manage and assess [33]. We therefore require
new tools and techniques to assess their reliability. One possible
solution is to use a network graph theory approach to quantify the
reliability of these complex infrastructure systems.
Network graph theory has previously been used to analyse a
range of systems and provides a rigorous mathematical basis for
the analysis of connected elements, enabling aspects of aggregate
performance of networked systems to be rapidly calculated [10].
Network models are being increasingly used to improve our un-
derstanding of: social systems [2,26,3], neural networks [35,36,6],
biological networks [34] and computer science systems [37],
amongst others. Studies applying network theory to real-worldr Ltd. All rights reserved.systems, have recently turned from the analysis of social and
biological networks, where space is not traditionally a governing
factor, to the analysis of infrastructure systems, which can be
distributed over vast geographic regions [14,16,28]. In the case of
infrastructure systems, it has been assumed that because many of
these networks have been shown to be topologically resilient to a
random hazard (e.g. a reliability failure of individual components)
they are also resilient to spatially dispersed random hazards (e.g.
snowstorm, windstorm). However, Wilkinson et al. [38] analysed
the impacts of the Eyjafjallajökull volcano to the European Air
Traffic Network and found that this network showed a surprising
vulnerability to this hazard, contradicting its assumed topological
hazard tolerance. They found that this vulnerability was due to a
combination of its topological characteristics and geographical
distribution of airports in the network, which is not accounted for
in traditional network theory studies, which only consider net-
work topology. The little research that has analysed real-world
spatial networks (e.g. infrastructure systems) focuses mainly on
characterising the topology of the system, while the spatial ele-
ment of the same network receives less attention - if not neglected
entirely [5]. There are a few studies that have considered the
“spatial” resilience of interdependent gas and electrical networks
[29,31] or the resilience of China air traffic network [24,30], for
example. However, all of these studies have assessed specific real-
world applications of spatial resilience and have not considered
the overarching, or inherent, resilience of spatial networks in
general.
In this paper, we aim to give an assessment of the spatial
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manner to the study by Albert et al. [1] who considered topological
resilience. To achieve this, we provide a robust framework that can
quantify the reliability of a complex system to a range of spatial
hazards. Unlike previous spatial hazard studies, we do no focus
solely on one real-world system but instead generate a range of
synthetic networks (termed ‘benchmark networks’) to use in our
resiliency testing. However, we do show that these benchmark
networks are characteristic of real-world systems and relate our
findings from the ‘benchmark networks’ to these real-world sys-
tems. We consider three classes of relational network model
(random, scale-free and exponential networks) which are com-
bined with two different spatial nodal configurations and assess
their hazard tolerance to two different locations of a ‘growing’
spatial hazard.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, the
paper considers the spatial nodal configuration of the ‘benchmark
networks’ and Section 3 considers their network class (i.e. topol-
ogy). Section 4 develops the spatial hazard models to be used to in
our analysis, to which our ‘benchmark networks’ are then sub-
jected in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 provides conclusions and
ideas for future research.2. Nodal configuration
There has been very little research into the nodal locations of
real-world networks. The majority of previous research has in-
vestigated pre-existing real-world networks and has therefore
used the actual nodal locations [17], or has used purely topological
models [17,18,7]. The location of nodes within a real-world net-
work is a very complex problem. In the case of real world systems,
nodes may represent cities, regions within cities or individual in-
frastructure components. Furthermore these systems are dynamic,
evolving over time in response to a myriad of drivers such as de-
mographic shifts, technological advancement and availability of
resources. Therefore, we generate a range of generic nodal loca-
tions and use these to form spatial ‘benchmark networks’ for
testing resiliency. These benchmarks capture the overall distribu-
tion of nodes in geographical networks, but not necessarily the
small scale local areas of high density nodes (e.g. the model will
capture the spread of airports over a continent, but not necessarily
the high density of airports clustered around a population centre).
This allows us to draw conclusions on the overall hazard tolerance
of spatial networks, in a similar manner to traditional topological
hazard assessments.
In this paper, we simulate two different spatial nodal layouts
and contain them within a ‘spatial boundary’, outside which no
nodes are allowed to form. In the case of a real-world network,
this spatial boundary could represent the extent of a land
boundary or air space in the case of an air traffic network. We are
considering generic spatial layouts in this paper, rather than si-
mulating one area in particular, and have therefore chosen to
enclose the networks in a circular boundary. The two different
spatial nodal layouts used in this paper are:
 Uniform with distance (Fig. 1(a)) – the number of nodes increases
linearly with distance away from the geographic centre of the
network
 Uniform with area (Fig. 1(b)) – the nodes are spread evenly over
the network.
The spatial distributions for the two nodal layouts are shown in
Fig. 1. These distributions plot the number of nodes against dis-
tance from the geographic centre. From this figure, it can be seen
that the uniform with distance configuration shows a linearrelationship between the proportion of nodes and the distance
from geographical centre, whereas the uniform with area config-
uration exhibits a quadratic relationship.3. Network classes and models
Relational network models do not include a spatial component,
therefore we modify the traditional generation algorithms of
random, scale-free and exponential networks to generate a range
of spatial networks. All of the generated networks used in this
paper have 500 nodes and approximately 3200 links. We have
chosen to generate scale-free and exponential networks as they
have been shown to capture the real-world characteristics of many
infrastructure systems (for example: [32,39]). Whilst, random
networks are often used in tests of network robustness to de-
termine if a more structured network is resilient or vulnerable to
the applied hazard, due to the homogeneous nature [22,25].
3.1. Random network
In this paper, we generate the random networks using the al-
gorithm of Erdos and Renyi [13]. In this generation algorithm, each
pair of nodes is considered in turn and a connection (link) is made
between them based upon a value of linking probability (the
higher this value the more likely it is that a link will be generated).
If the linking probability is equal to 1, then the network will be
saturated (i.e. it will have the maximum possible number of links)
and if this value equals 0 there will be no links in the network. We
do not modify this generation algorithm to take into account the
spatial distance between nodes as we are not seeking to create the
most efficient network possible (i.e. we are not seeking to mini-
mise, or maximise, the distances between pairs of nodes). In this
paper, we are using the random network as a benchmark for tests
of resilience for the other two more sophisticated network classes
and therefore choose the linking probability to result in approxi-
mately the same number of links as these two networks (around
0.025, which results in a network with approximately 3200 links).
The degree distributions for the generated networks can be seen in
Fig. 2(a) and the associated spatial degree distributions are shown
in Fig. 2(b).
3.2. Scale-free network
The scale-free network was first identified and developed by
Barabasi and Albert [4] and is based upon the ideas of growth and
preferential attachment [5]. These networks are formed by starting
with an initial number of isolated nodes, m0, which is usually a
small percentage of the total number of nodes in the network.
New nodes are then added to the network at each ‘time step’ (i.e.
‘growing’ the network) until the total number of nodes in the
network is reached. These added nodes have between 1 and m0
links attached to them and connect to the existing nodes in the
network based upon the idea of ‘preferential attachment’. The
probability of attaching to each existing node is calculated based
upon its degree, with the nodes with a high degree being more
likely to ‘attract’ a link from the new node (i.e. the rich get richer).
It is this ‘preferential attachment’ rule which results in a few high
degree nodes and many small degree nodes in the network. If a
spatial layout of the network as nodes are introduced into the
network those nodes that are introduced early in the process have
more chance to ‘attract’ links from other nodes compared to nodes
introduced later to the network and are therefore more likely to
have a higher degree than those introduce late, which in turn has a
significant impact upon their spatial hazard tolerance [11].
Therefore we study three methods of choosing the introduction
Fig. 1. Showing the (a) uniform with distance nodal configuration, (b) its associated spatial distribution and also (c) the uniform with area nodal configuration and (d) its
associated spatial distribution.
Fig. 2. Showing the (a) degree distributions and (b) spatial degree distributions for the random networks with a uniform with area and uniform with distance nodal layout.
The reader is referred to Table 1 for an explanation of the legend used in this figure.
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 Random – the node location does not affect the order in which
nodes are added to the network (i.e. it is completely random).
 Distance from the geographic centre – nodes are introduced
shortest to furthest distance away from the geographic centre
(i.e. midpoint) of the network.
 Proportional to distance from the geographic centre – similar to
previous, with the exception that all nodes are assigned a
probability value (with those in the centre of the network
having the highest probabilities) and are introduced based onthis value. Nodes in the centre of the network are more likely to
be chosen to be introduced first.
The different spatial distributions, resulting from the three
different node introduction orders, can be seen in Fig. 3(b) and
(d) and also shown visually on a sample network in Fig. 4. From
these figures, it can be seen that networks where nodes were in-
troduced with distance from the geographic centre show a greater
proportion of high degree nodes around the centre of the spatial
domain (Fig. 4(a)), when compared to networks were the nodes
were introduced randomly (Fig. 4(c)). This is expected as these
Fig. 3. Showing the (a) topological degree distributions and (b) spatial degree distributions for the scale-free networks with a uniform with distance nodal layout, and also
showing the (c) topological degree distributions and (d) spatial degree distributions for the scale-free networks with a uniform with are nodal layout. In all cases, the three
nodal introduction orders are shown (with distance from the geographic centre, proportional to distance from the geographic centre and randomly). The reader is referred to
Table 1 for an explanation of the legend used in this figure.
Fig. 4. Three scale-free networks with a uniform with area nodal layout, where the nodes are introduced to the network: (a) with distance from the geographical centre,
(b) proportion with distance from the geographic centre, and (c) randomly. The spatial boundary is shown as a black circle and the nodes are shown as grey-scale dots. The
colour of the node indicates its degree, with black nodes having a high degree and light grey nodes a low degree. The links between the nodes have been omitted for clarity.
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and have therefore had more chances to attract links from nodes
that were introduced at a later ‘time step’. In contrast, the high
degree nodes in the network where the nodes have been in-
troduced randomly are more spatially dispersed over the whole
layout of the network, with the proportion to distance layout ex-
hibiting behaviour in between these two extremes. It is also in-
teresting to note that the degree distributions for all of the scale-
free networks are approximately the same (Fig. 3(a) and (c)).
3.3. Exponential network
The exponential network class is not as well documented as the
other classes of network model; however, one model to create
exponential networks with a spatial component does exist,developed by Wilkinson et al. [38]. This algorithm is based on the
scale-free network model [4], but with the modification that al-
lows low degree nodes capitalise on their close proximity to high
degree nodes and attract links that were bound for the high de-
gree node. Following Barabasi and Albert [4], the algorithm starts
with an initial number of starting nodes, m0, and the remaining
nodes are added individually to the network. Similarly to the
scale-free model, each new node added has between 1 and m0
links attached to it, which it uses to preferentially attach to the
existing network. However, this preference is now based on the
degree of all nodes within the ‘neighbourhood’ of the node we are
attempting to attach to, rather than that of individual nodes,
which is set by assigning a radius, r. Setting the radius to zero
removes the spatial dependence of the network resulting in a
scale-free network, while setting the radius to twice the size of the
Fig. 5. Showing the (a) degree distributions and (b) spatial degree distributions for the exponential networks with a uniform with distance nodal layout, and also showing
the (c) degree distributions and (d) spatial degree distributions for the exponential networks with a uniform with are nodal layout. In all cases, the three nodal introduction
orders are shown (with distance from the geographic centre, proportional to distance from the geographic centre and randomly). The reader is referred to Table 1 for an
explanation of the legend used in this figure.
Table 1
Showing the number networks created and analysed for each network class, nodal
configuration and node introduction order. It is worth noting that random net-
works are unaffected by node introduction order, as decisions to connect pairs of
nodes (via links) are independent of any spatial influences.
Network Spatial nodal
configuration
Node introduction order
Randomly (R) Distance (D) Proportional
with dis-
tance (P)
Scale-Free (SF) Uniform with
Distance (UD)
10 10 10
Uniform with
Area (UA)
10 10 10
Exponential (EX) Uniform with
Distance (UD)
10 10 10
Uniform with
Area (UA)
10 10 10
Random (RND) Uniform with
Distance (UD)
10
Uniform with
Area (UA)
10
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networks in this paper using the algorithm of Wilkinson et al. [38],
using the value of r¼0.25; the resulting degree distributions are
shown in Fig. 5(a) and (c). It is worth noting that strictly speaking
this network is in fact a truncated scale-free network as described
by Guimera et al. [19] but could with equal validity be called an
exponential network with a scale-free tail. For convenience and to
distinguish them from scale-free networks, in this paper we will
refer to them as exponential networks.
Similar to the scale-free networks, the order in which nodes are
introduced to the network impacts upon the spatial location of the
high degree nodes and therefore affects the spatial hazard toler-
ance of the network. To investigate this impact we use the same
three methods of node introduction order as used for the scale-
free networks. The resulting spatial degree distributions are
shown in Fig. 5(b) and (d), where it can again be seen that in-
troducing nodes in order of distance from the geographic centre
results in a greater proportion of high degree nodes in this area,
compared to introducing nodes randomly.
3.4. ‘Benchmark Network’ summary
In this paper, we use the three network generation algorithms
and two spatial nodal configurations to generate a total of 140
‘benchmark networks’ outlined in Table 1.
3.5. Real-world infrastructure characteristics
In this paper, we have generated a range of spatial networks
which we intend to use for resilience testing. To show that these
synthetic networks are characteristic of real-world infrastructuresystems we have collected and analysed the topological and spa-
tial properties of a series of real-world datasets of different sizes
and scales, shown in Table 2. We assess their topological proper-
ties in terms of the degree distribution and consider their spatial
properties by plotting the spatial distribution (which is obtained
by plotting the distance from the weighted geographic centre
against the number of nodes within this radius) and spatial degree
distribution (similar to the spatial distribution, but plots the sum
Table 2
Showing the topological and spatial characteristics of a number of real-world infrastructure systems. The data regarding the three air traffic networks was obtained from
[27], the UK National Grid data was obtained from the RESNET project (see Acknowledgements), the UK rail network was obtained from [9] and the US rail network and
highway network were obtained from [8]. The reader is referred to Table 1 for an explanation of the legend used in this figure.
Network Number of nodes/links Degree distribution Spatial distribution Spatial degree distribution Synthetic proxy
European Air Traffic Network 525/3886 Exponential Uniform with Distance Uniform with Distance EX-UD-D
US Air Traffic Network 363/2289 Exponential Uniform with Area Uniform with Area EX-UA-P
China Air Traffic Network 124/828 Exponential Uniform with Distance Uniform with Distance EX-UD-D
UK National Grid 218/278 Exponential Uniform with Distance Uniform with Distance EX-UD-D
UK Rail Network 4095/5942 Exponential Uniform with Area Uniform with Area EX-UA-D
US Rail Network 24,038/27,768 Exponential Uniform with Distance Uniform with Distance EX-UD-P
US Highway Network 74,027/111,936 Scale-Free Uniform with Distance Uniform with Distance SF-UD-R
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detailed, and graphical, explanation of these measures the reader
is directed to Dunn et al. [12].
In Table 2 the synthetic network to which these real-world
systems most closely align has also been identified. It is ac-
knowledged that many of these real-world systems do not follow
the exact ‘smooth’ spatial distribution of the synthetic networks,
as they can show slight distortions due to the local clustering of
nodes (for example, the UK rail network shows a dis-
proportionately high number of stations clustered around London,
when compared to the rest of the UK).4. Spatial and topological hazard scenarios
In this paper, we simulate a range of hazards, aiming to assess
the hazard tolerance of the networks to a variety of different ‘at-
tacks’. Two of the hazards have a spatial component and two are
topological. We will later demonstrate that adding a spatial ele-
ment to our network generation algorithms does not alter the
topological behaviour of these networks. We subject the networks
to a topological degree attack (removing nodes in order of their
degree from highest to lowest) and a topological random hazard
(removing nodes randomly from the network). The two spatialFig. 6. Showing the growing (a–c) ‘central attack’ and (d–f) ‘perimeter attack’ spatial haza
the spatial boundary as a black circle. The hazard centre is shown using a large black dot
network area.hazards that we use in this paper are:
 ‘Central attack’ (Fig. 6(a)–(c)) – the centre of the hazard is fixed
at the geographic centre of the network and the size of the
hazard is increased.
 ‘Perimeter attack’ (Fig. 6(d)–(f)) – the centre of the hazard is fixed
at a point on the spatial boundary of the network and the size of
the hazard is increased.
In the spatial hazard analysis, we remove nodes, and their
connecting links, from the network as they are impacted by the
spatial hazard (e.g. as they are covered by the grey circles in Fig. 6).
In this paper, we have chosen to apply our developed metho-
dology to assess the disruption caused by spatial hazards, as this
element of network theory is usually neglected in studies of real-
world systems [5]. However, we could equally have chosen to
apply this methodology to the analysis of random nodal failure or
sought to remove nodes with poor reliability ratings from the
network and quantified this impact. The same methodology can be
utilised by simply changing the order in which nodes (and their
connecting links) are removed from the network (e.g. removing
nodes in order of their reliability rating).rds, overlaid on a nodal layout; where the nodes are indicated by the black dots and
(for all hazards), fromwhich the hazard grows (grey circle) until it covers the whole
S. Dunn, S. Wilkinson / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 157 (2017) 1–12 75. Results and discussion
There is a large combination of results that could be presented
from the analysis, therefore, to keep this section, and the paper, to
a manageable length we focus on three main research questions.
Firstly, we consider the impact that node introduction order has to
the resulting hazard tolerance of the spatial scale-free and ex-
ponential networks; secondly, we consider the impact that nodal
configuration has to hazard tolerance and finally, we consider the
combinations of hazard, node introduction order and nodal con-
figuration that produces the ‘worst’ and ‘best’ resilience and
compare this to the results of ‘traditional’ topological hazard.
We present the results in terms of the proportion of failed links
and the proportion of failed nodes/area. We also quantify the re-
liability/resilience of networks with different characteristics using
a modified version of the Relative Spatial Vulnerability Index
(RSVI) of Li et al. [24], which is a formalised measure of the
methodology derived by Wilkinson et al. [38], given by Eq. (1). The
original RSVI calculates the percentage change in the area between
the sophisticated network (g(x)) and the benchmark resilience
network (gBM(x)) when plotting the proportion of area covered by
the hazard against the proportion of impacted (or removed) nodes.
This results in one numerical value of resilience for the sophisti-
cated network, when compared to the benchmark network. In this
paper, we modify this approach in three ways. Firstly, we convert
the value to a percentage in order to present the percentage
change between the test network and the benchmark, which is a
more comparable and interpretable measure of relative resilience.
Secondly, for test networks that show both resilience and vul-
nerability, compared to the benchmark network, we do not use
one value of this measure but rather calculate the RSVI for eachFig. 7. Showing the hazard tolerance of scale-free networks with (a) uniform with distan
of failed nodes by the growing ‘central attack’ spatial hazard and the proportion of failed
with distance and (d) uniform with area nodal layouts. In all graphs the random bench
reader is referred to Table 1 for an explanation of the legend used in this figure.section (i.e. one value for the vulnerable section and one for the
resilient section). We make note of where the test network in-
tersects the benchmark (i.e. the point where it has the same ha-
zard tolerance) and use this point to define the limits i and j (in Eq.
(1)) setting the range with which the resilience, or vulnerability, is
considered. It is worth noting that for a network which is entirely
resilient or vulnerable, when compared to the benchmark net-
work, i and j equate to 0 and 1 respectively. We make this dis-
tinction in order to gain further insight into the magnitude of the
vulnerability and resilient components and also to highlight the
point at which the network switches from vulnerable to resilient,
or vice versa. Finally, we reverse the sign of the original RSVI
measure, in order to generate a negative value for networks that
are more vulnerable compared to the benchmark and a positive
value for networks that are more resilient. We do this to ensure
the output value is not misinterpreted.
)
)∫=
( )− (
(
× −
( )
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
g x g x
g x
dxRSVI 100%
1i
j
BM
BM
modified
In addition to this measure, we also quantify the initial gradient
of the networks (when plotting the proportion of closed nodes/
area against removed links) to determine their resilience to small
scale spatial disruptions.
5.1. Impact of node introduction order
We initially identify the impact that node introduction order
has to the hazard tolerance of the scale-free and exponential
networks, when compared to the random benchmark networks. In
this analysis we consider the uniform with distance and uniformce and (b) uniform with area nodal layouts, when plotted in terms of the proportion
links. Also showing the same results for the exponential networks with (c) uniform
mark networks, with the corresponding nodal configuration, are also shown. The
Table 3
Quantification of the resilience of scale-free networks (shown in Fig. 7(a) and (b)),
with either a uniform with distance (UD) or uniform with area (UA) nodal
configuration, with regards to random benchmark networks with the same nodal
configuration. The reader is referred to Table 1 for an explanation of the legend
used in this table.
Network Modified RSVI Initial Gradient
SF-UD-D 24.18% 5.66
SF-UD-P 14.63% 4.06
SF-UD-R þ2.09% 1.77
RND-UD – 1.92
SF-UA-D 24.15% 8.99
SF-UA-P 6.82% 3.72
SF-UA-R þ0.70% 2.09
RND-UA – 2.02
Table 4
Quantification of the resilience of exponential networks (shown in Fig. 7(c) and
(d)), with either a uniform with distance (UD) or uniform with area (UA) nodal
configuration, with regards to random benchmark networks with the same nodal
configuration. The reader is referred to Table 1 for an explanation of the legend
used in this table.
Network Modified ASVI Initial Gradient
EX-UD-D 20.66% 4.30
EX-UD-P 14.20% 3.54
EX-UD-R 0.24% 1.62
RND-UD – 1.92
EX-UA-D 19.74% 6.23
EX-UA-P 8.06% 4.69
EX-UA-R þ0.34% 2.56
RND-UA – 2.02
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tack’ spatial hazard (Fig. 6(a)–(c)). The results of this analysis are
shown in Fig. 7, where we plot the proportion of failed nodes
against the proportion of failed links.
The results, presented in Fig. 7 and Tables 3 and 4, show that
the spatial hazard tolerance of the networks is largely governed by
the location of the high degree nodes in the network. The syn-
thetic networks where the nodes have been introduced with dis-
tance, and consequently have the majority of high degree nodes
are located around the geographic centre of the network (see
Fig. 4), show a high vulnerability to hazards located over this area.
Whereas, networks where the nodes have been introduced ran-
domly, and therefore have a dispersion of high degree nodes, show
approximately the same resilience as the random benchmark
networks. These results are to be expected when considering the
location of the high degree nodes, however, this expectation does
not provide a means to quantify the change in resilience. This is
achieved from the modified RSVI measure, which shows that the
networks with a spatial dispersion of nodes are approximately 24%
more resilient than networks with a cluster of high degree nodes.
The initial gradient of the networks also shows this increase in
vulnerability, with the gradient of the networks with a cluster of
high degree nodes being more than 3 times greater than that of
networks with spatially dispersed high degree nodes.
5.2. Impact of spatial nodal configuration
We now consider the impact that the nodal configuration has
to the resilience of the scale-free and exponential networks, when
compared to the random benchmark networks. In this analysis, we
consider both the uniform with distance and uniform with area
nodal configurations, but only the random node introduction or-
der (to negate the impact that the placement of high degree nodes
has to the hazard tolerance, as shown in the previous section) andsubject these networks to both the ‘central attack’ and ‘perimeter
attack’ spatial hazards. The results of this analysis are plotted in
Fig. 8, in terms of the proportion of closed area (i.e. the proportion
of area affect by the spatial hazard) and the resulting proportion of
failed links. From this figure, it can be seen that the results for the
scale-free and exponential networks are very similar to that of the
random benchmarks and therefore the quantification using the
modified RSVI measure is not presented in this case (but for all
networks is calculated to be in the range of a 0–1.5% change in
resilience). The initial gradient for these results are presented in
Table 5.
From these results, it can be seen that the geographic nodal
configuration is also a governing factor in determining the resi-
lience of the network. Focusing on the ‘central attack’ spatial ha-
zard (Fig. 8(a) and (c)), it can be seen that networks with a uniform
with distance nodal configuration show the most vulnerability, for
all sizes of hazard. This difference in vulnerability is quantified
using the modified RSVI measure, shown in Table 6, where it can
be seen that the networks with a uniform with distance nodal
configurations are approximately 26% more vulnerable to the
‘central attack’ spatial hazard than those with a uniform with area
configuration. This increased vulnerability is also shown by the
increased initial gradient values (Table 5) and is due to the pre-
sence of a large proportion of nodes around the geographic centre
in the uniform with distance configuration (Fig. 1(a)), meaning
that for only a small hazard size a large proportion of nodes are
removed.
In contrast to this vulnerability, the high proportion of nodes
clustered around the centre of the network in the uniform with
distance nodal configuration, causes the networks show resilience
to small hazards located at the perimeter of the network (Fig. 8
(b) and (d)). These networks are around 19% more resilient than
those with a uniform with area configuration for small sizes of
spatial hazard, covering up to 35% of the spatial area of the net-
work (Table 7). After this point, the networks with a uniform with
distance configuration show increasing vulnerability and are ap-
proximately 12% more vulnerable than the networks with a uni-
form with area configuration.
5.3. Impact of spatial hazard vs. impact of topological hazard
In this section, we compare the impacts that both spatial and
topological hazards have on the networks. We consider the com-
binations of nodal configuration, node introduction order and
spatial hazard that produce the most vulnerable network (refer-
ring to this as the ‘worst case’ scenario) and the most resilient
network (referring to this as the ‘best case’ scenario). We compare
the ‘worst case’ scenario to the topological degree attack, as both
scale-free and exponential networks have been shown to be in-
herently vulnerable to this attack strategy. And we compare the
‘best case’ scenario to the topological random hazard, as these
network classes have been shown to be inherently resilient to this
hazard. The results of this analysis and comparison to the best and
worst case spatial networks (Fig. 8) are shown in Fig. 9, in terms of
the proportion of nodes removed against the proportion of links
removed.
Considering the ‘worst case’ scenarios, Fig. 9 shows that both
the scale-free and exponential networks are more vulnerable to
the topological degree attack than the ‘central attack’ spatial ha-
zard, which is quantified using the modified RSVI measure in Ta-
ble 8. These results show that the ‘worst case’ network combina-
tion is between 5% and 13% more resilient to the spatial hazard
than the topological attack. Whilst there is a high proportion of
high degree nodes located around the centre of the network
(which are removed first by the ‘central attack’ spatial hazard)
there are still some lower degree nodes present in this area (see
Fig. 8. Showing the hazard tolerance of scale-free networks with uniform with distance and uniform with area nodal layouts, when subjected to (a) ‘central attack’ and (b)
‘perimeter’ spatial hazards, with the results plotted in terms of the proportion of area closed (or covered) by the growing spatial hazard. Also showing the same results for
the exponential networks with a uniform with distance and uniform with area nodal layouts when subjected to the (c) ‘central attack’ and (d) ‘perimeter’ spatial hazards. In
all graphs the random benchmark networks are also shown, but may be difficult to distinguish as they have the same results as the scale-free and exponential networks with
the same nodal configuration. The reader is referred to Table 1 for an explanation of the legend used in this table.
Table 5
Quantification of the initial gradient of the scale-free and exponential networks,
shown in Fig. 8.
Network Hazard Initial gradient
SF-UD-R Central attack 21.41
Perimeter attack 0.60
SF-UA-R Central attack 2.09
Perimeter attack 1.00
EX-UD-R Central attack 19.57
Perimeter attack 0.60
EX-UA-R Central attack 2.57
Perimeter attack 1.00
Table 6
Comparison of the quantified resilience of scale-free and exponential networks,
shown in Fig. 8(a) and (c) respectively.
Series Modified RSVI
Resilience of SF-UD-R (central attack) compared to SF-UA-R
(central attack)
25.18%
Resilience of EX-UD-R (central attack) compared to EX-UA-R
(central attack)
26.09%
Table 7
Comparison of the quantified resilience of scale-free and exponential networks,
shown in Fig. 8(b) and (d) respectively.
Series Modified RSVI
(from 0% to 35%)
Modified RSVI
(from 35% to 100%)
Resilience of SF-UD-R (perimeter
attack) compared to SF-UA-R
(perimeter attack)
þ19.53% 11.95%
Resilience of EX-UD-R (perimeter
attack) compared to EX-UA-R
(perimeter attack)
þ18.30% 11.95%
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hazard (as it will remove fewer links) than the topological degree
attack as this removes nodes in order of their degree.
The ‘best case’ scale-free and exponential networks both show
an initial resilience to the ‘perimeter attack’ spatial hazardcompared to the topological random hazard, until 38% of nodes
have been removed, shown in Fig. 9 and quantified Table 9. This is
due to the large proportion of low degree nodes close to the spatial
boundary of the network, which are removed first by the spatial
hazard; whereas, the topological random hazard has an equal
chance of removing each node in the network and will therefore
tend remove the majority low degree nodes but will also remove a
few higher degree nodes, causing the network to show more
vulnerability to this attack strategy. However, as the spatial hazard
reaches the geographic centre the network becomes increasingly
vulnerable to further expansion of the hazard, causing the network
to be more vulnerable to this attack strategy than the topological
random hazard.
This analysis has shown that whilst the location of nodes and
also the location of the high degree nodes are governing factors in
determining the resilience of a network to spatial hazard, the
Fig. 9. Showing (a, c) the ‘worst case’ and (b, d) ‘best case’ spatial and topological hazards for the scale-free and exponential networks respectively. We identify the spatial
hazard and network combination that produces the ‘worst case’ results to be the uniform with distance network where nodes are introduced with distance from the
geographical centre when subjected to the ‘central attack’ hazard. And the ‘worst case’ topological hazard to be that which removes nodes in order of their degree, highest to
lowest. We also identify to spatial hazard and network combination that produces the ‘best case’ results to be the uniformwith distance network where nodes are introduced
with distance from the geographic centre when subjected to the ‘perimeter attack’ spatial hazard and the ‘best case’ topological hazard, of those tested, to be the random
attack.
Table 8
Comparison of the quantified resilience of scale-free and exponential networks,
shown in Fig. 9(a) and (c) respectively.
Series Modified RSVI
Resilience of SF-UD-D (central attack) compared to SF-UD-D
(topo degree)
þ4.88%
Resilience of EX-UD-D (central attack) compared to EX-UD-D
(topo degree)
þ13.17%
Table 9
Comparison of the quantified resilience of scale-free and exponential networks,
shown in Fig. 9(b) and (d) respectively.
Series Modified RSVI
(from 0% to 35%)
Modified RSVI
(from 35% to 100%)
Resilience of SF-UD-D (perimeter
attack) compared to SF-UD-D
(topo random)
þ23.08% 4.85%
Resilience of EX-UD-R (perimeter
attack) compared to EX-UD-R
(topo random)
þ32.75% 5.19%
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sidered in order to gain the ‘whole picture’ of a networks
resilience.5.4. Implications for real-world networks
In this paper, we have so far considered the resilience of our
synthetic benchmark networks to a range of spatial and topolo-
gical hazards. However, the results from these networks also have
many potentially important implications for real-world systems.
We have considered a range of real-world infrastructure systems
in this paper and have identified their “synthetic proxy” network
(see Table 2). Therefore, we can now make several conclusions
regarding their spatial hazard tolerance, much in the same way as
traditional network theory forms conclusions regarding the to-
pological hazard tolerance of a network by considering its network
class.
Considering the location of the high degree, or hub, nodes in
the networks our results indicate that six out of the seven real-
world networks would be highly vulnerable to all sizes of spatial
hazard located over their geographic centre. Only the US highway
network would show a level of resilience to this location of spatial
hazard, due to the random dispersion of high degree nodes
throughout the network. This finding may be surprising, as it is
expected that real-world systems would have a level of resilience
to disruptive events. However, their spatial distribution of high
degree nodes renders them vulnerable to hazards located over this
area. In the case of real-world infrastructure systems, this property
could lead to potentially devastating wide-scale social and eco-
nomic impacts if this area was impacted by hazard.
A total of five real-world networks, considered in this paper,
display a uniform with distance configuration and our results
show that these networks can be expected to show an increased
S. Dunn, S. Wilkinson / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 157 (2017) 1–12 11vulnerability if the area around their geographic centre is affected
by hazard. This is due to the high proportion of nodes (or infra-
structure assets) in this region. Conversely, they will also show an
increased resilience if the perimeter of the network is affected.
This analysis has also shown that for the two real-world networks
that show a uniform with area configuration their resilience, or
vulnerability, to spatial hazard is governed by the location of their
high degree nodes, as any location of hazard over these networks
will remove approximately the same number of nodes.
Overall, the results of this paper have shown that, from the
real-world networks considered (Table 2), the US Air Traffic Net-
work should be the most resilient to spatial hazards (due to its
uniform with area nodal configuration). However, as this network
has an exponential degree distribution it is inherently vulnerable
to hazards affecting the high degree nodes. Therefore, it can be
concluded that both the spatial and topological characteristics of a
network must be considered in any hazard tolerance, resilience or
reliability analysis.6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have considered the spatial hazard tolerance
of a range of generic networks, in a similar manner to the topo-
logical study by Albert et al. [1]. To achieve this, we have presented
a methodology to quantify the resilience of networks when sub-
jected to hazard. To develop the spatial synthetic networks, we
considered two spatial nodal configurations and three network
generation algorithms. We assessed their resilience to two loca-
tions of a “growing” spatial hazard and also subjected them to two
topological hazards.
We initially showed that the order in which nodes are in-
troduced to the scale-free and exponential networks (in the net-
work generation algorithms) has a significant impact upon their
hazard tolerance, due to the placement of high degree nodes
(Fig. 7). Networks where the nodes were introduced with distance
from the geographic centre of the network were particularly vul-
nerable to hazards located over this area, being approximately 25%
more vulnerable than the random benchmark networks (with an
initial gradient of 5.66, compared to the random benchmark gra-
dient of 1.96) (Tables 3 and 4). Networks where the high degree
nodes were spatially dispersed (by introducing nodes at random
locations to the network) were around 2% more resilient than the
benchmark networks (using the modified RSVI value). This can be
expected, as removing high degree nodes in a network will have
more of an impact then removing lower degree nodes, however
the significance of this paper is the quantification of these results.
We also considered the impact that nodal configuration has on
the networks, finding that the uniform with distance nodal con-
figuration was vulnerable to hazards located over the geographic
centre of the network. In contrast, the uniform with area nodal
configuration showed the same resilience to both locations of
spatial hazard, due to the dispersion of nodes over the whole area,
the modified RSVI measure showed that this nodal configuration is
around 25% more resilient than the uniform with distance con-
figuration (Table 6). Finally, it can be concluded that the spatial
networks assessed in this paper showed a greater vulnerability to
targeted topological hazard than the ‘worst case’ scenario of spa-
tial hazard (being up to 13% more vulnerable as measured by the
modified RSVI measure, Table 8). Whilst, the ‘best case’ combina-
tion of spatial network was up to 33% more resilient to a small
scale random spatial hazard than the random topological hazard
(Table 9).
In this paper, we also correlated the spatial and topological
characteristics of a range of geographically distributed infra-
structure systems with our generic networks. Of these networkswe showed that five real world networks (European and China Air
Traffic Networks, UK National Grid, US Rail Network and US
Highway Network) displayed a uniform with distance nodal con-
figuration and hence they are inherently vulnerable to even small
spatial hazards located over their geographic centre. In contrast,
the spatial hazard tolerance of the other two real-world networks,
with a uniform with area configuration is governed by the location
of the high degree nodes. This research has important implications
for the analysis of real-world spatial networks in that a spatial
hazard tolerance analysis must be carried out in addition to a to-
pological assessment to fully understand the resilience of a net-
work that has a significant or potentially governing, spatial
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